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Abstract: Responding to mass casualty incidents in a tunnel environment is problematic not least from a
prehospital emergency medical services (EMS) perspective. The aim of this review was to 1) categorize
preconditions for emergency response in tunnel environments based on Haddon’s matrix and 2) identify specific
EMS knowledge of providing prehospital care. Twenty eight articles, reports and book chapters were selected for
further analysis. Firstly, sorting the data from each included article was done according to Haddon’s matrix. The
result covers human factors, technical factors, physical environmental factors and socioeconomic environmental
factors all related to preconditions for emergency response. To describe the EMS’s knowledge the data was
also sorted according to command and safety, communication, assessment, and triage treatment and transport,
also known as CSCATT. Few studies, especially of high quality, actually provide detailed information regarding
emergency response to tunnel incidents and those that do, often have a main focus on management by the
rescue service. While many incidents studied were caused by fires in tunnels, thus requiring rescue service
in action, the subsequent EMS response issues that have taken place appear to have been given limited
attention. To optimize the survival rates and health of the injured, as well as to provide a safe and effective work
environment for the emergency services, there is a need to explore the event phase.
Keywords: emergency medical care; emergency response; major incidents; mass casualty incident;
tunnels; prehospital care
1. Introduction
Mass casualty incidents (MCIs) remain an extraordinary chal-
lenge for prehospital response. A number of studies of MCIs
have highlighted the need for further general knowledge in
the areas of initial treatment and transport of patients [1], com-
munication [2,3], joint training of emergency services [4], and
call for more systematic reporting and research on possible
associations between actions and outcomes to improve the
emergency response [5]. The ramifications of incidents in
difficult and confined environments, such as tunnels or other
underground sites adds further challenges for emergency
response and the outcomes can be devastating, as seen in
the Baku Metro fire (289 people killed) [6] and the Daegu
underground railway station fire (198 people killed) [7]. Other
types of incidents are tunnel collapses, e.g. at a nuclear test
site in North Korea (about 200 people killed) [8], which in turn,
led to concerns about radiation and safety for personnel as
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half of the deaths occurred during prehospital response.
Increasing traffic frequencies, driving speeds, number of
hazardous goods transports, and higher loading capacities
constitute some risk factors for increased numbers of tunnel
incidents [7,9]. While the probability of an incident in a tun-
nel can be considered comparatively low to on open roads
[9,10], the consequences are more extensive, measured
in percentage of injured and killed [10–12]. Should a fire
ensue, self-rescue will most likely determine chances of sur-
vival, given the speed with which a fire develops. However,
some of the tunnel users may require assisted evacuation
by emergency services i.e. rescue services (RS) and emer-
gency medical services (EMS) [10]. Meanwhile emergency
response to tunnel incidents may be impaired, because of
limited access routes and possible traffic jams [10–12] as
well as conditions in the tunnel, for instance impaired vision
and extreme heat exposure in the case of a fire [13].
With regard to tunnel fires, stakeholders often have an
overly optimistic view of the risk of an incident and its sever-
ity, combined with unrealistic expectations of emergency re-
sponse and underestimation of the potential for loss of life
[14]. Most of the existing literature on how to reduce the con-
sequences of an incident investigate aspects such as smoke,
ventilation, fire dynamics, construction, and risk assessment
[15]. In the rare cases where the rescuers’ perspectives re-
garding tunnel incidents have been studied, they focus on the
RS [14–16] not the EMS response. The practical problem is
thus that the tunnel environment directly increases the injuri-
ous effects of incidents while the EMS possibilities to respond
and save life are inhibited. The scientific problem is that re-
search has focused on primary prevention of technical issues
related to fire or other emergencies and aiding self-rescue, but
studies on EMS response to tunnel incidents are scarce.
The aim of this review is to 1) categorize preconditions
for emergency response in tunnel environments based on
Haddon’s matrix and 2) identify specific EMS knowledge of
providing prehospital care.
2. Methods and Materials
An integrative literature review generate new knowledge
by means of a synthesis of representative literature
[17]. In order to limit the risk of systematic errors [18]
searches were conducted in several databases (MED-
LINE/PubMed and EBSCOhost/ Academic Search Elite)
in April 2018 for articles published in English between
1980 and 2018. In PubMed MeSH-terms were used. Ad-
ditional several test searches with different terms, free
text words and filters were conducted in both databases.
Terms and wordings of interest in the searches were
chosen in correspondence with the eligibility aspects
a) tunnels/confined spaces, b)mass-casualty incidents,
and c) pre-hospital response (Table 1). Slightly different
keywords and clusters were used in the databases, as
MeSH terms could not be used in Academic Search Elite.
Tested words/terms did not add any records or generated
only irrelevant records (Table 2).
Table 1. Eligibility and inclusion and exclusion criteria.
Inclusion criteria
(1) tunnels or confined spaces;
- includes a tunnel under construction or used for transport or
similarly confined space
AND
(2a) mass casualty incident(s);
- specified incident or compounded analysis from several
intentional or unintentional incidents
OR
(2b) compounded lessons from smaller incidents
- injury panoramas seen in similar environments, with implications
for large scale events
AND
(3) pre-hospital response;
- included pre-conditions for and/or specifics regarding the
prehospital medical care on site
Exclusion criteria
- Risk assessments or risk perceptions
- Crash frequency and cause
- Fire spread / dynamics, smoke movement, ventilation, heat
transfer, or gas temperature
- Behavior/ reactions in tunnel incidents
- Psychological aid for victims or responders
- Management and identification of human remains
- Industrial safety
Table 2. Search strings.
PubMed ((“Confined Spaces”[mesh] OR “Subway*”[All Fields]
OR “Tunnel*”[All Fields]) AND (“Disasters”[mesh] OR
“Fires”[mesh] OR “Terrorism”[mesh] OR
“Accidents”[mesh] OR “rescue”[All Fields] OR
“Emergency Responders”[mesh] OR “Emergency
Medical Services”[mesh] OR “Emergency
Treatment”[mesh] OR “Critical Care”[mesh])) AND
“English”[Filter]
Academic
Search
Elite
((“confined space” OR subway OR tunnel) AND
(disaster OR fire OR accidents OR emergency OR
rescue OR ambulance OR “emergency response” OR
“emergency management” OR “emergency medical
services”)) + Limiters: Scholarly journals, English
language
For each title selected, additional titles of interest were also
found through the box “related citations in PubMed” and through
searches of the reference lists of the selected abstracts. Since
relatively few relevant studies were found, we conducted an
extended manual search for reports from tunnel incidents in
Sweden (Swedish Accident Investigation Board) and Norway
(Accident Investigation Board Norway), and it was decided that
relevant books found in reference lists would also be included.
Articles of interest were reviewed in a staged manner: firstly,
through readings of their titles; secondly, the chosen abstracts
and then the full texts were examined to confirm that they did
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not meet the exclusion criteria. To determine inclusion or ex-
clusion of articles, relevance to the aim was deemed to weigh
more than strict scientific standards and methodology. Studies
from both real-life events and exercises were included.
2.1. Screening for Relevance and Quality
The primary database searches yielded 2343 articles, out of
which 2308 were included in the title and abstract screening
and another 35 were included from manual and reference
searches (Figure 1). Many studies were excluded as they
focused on questions of engineering aspects of tunnel safety
(e.g. crash-prediction models or equations on technical as-
pects of fire-spread), leaving 61 texts for full text screening.
Further review found that 28 scientific articles, reports and
book chapters were deemed relevant and of scientific qual-
ity to merit inclusion. According to the evidence hierarchy
used in the study (c.f. [19]) none of the included literature
were systematic reviews or cross-sectional studies, but there
were three high-quality modelling studies. Thirteen of the
reviewed articles were medium-quality studies; one compar-
ative case study and 12 case studies. Two non-systematic
reviews/guidelines, nine special reports and one perspective
article were identified as low-quality studies.
2.2. Structure of Results
To respond to the first part (1) of the aim i.e. categorize
preconditions for EMS response in tunnel environments, the
matrix of Haddon Jr. regarding injury prevention [20] was
used. The data was applied to the matrix as a method for pro-
viding structure and to understand the content of the included
articles. In the Haddon matrix, injury mechanisms (harm-
ful energy) and their injury vector (energy carrier) [21] are
sequentially separated over time versus their contributing fac-
tors, i.e. human, technical, and environmental. Environmental
aspects may be further separated into physical and socioe-
conomic factors. In this study, the Haddon matrix was used
in an adapted fashion as it is typically applied to a specific
incident, not to compile a summary of factors found in studies
containing many types of incidents. Additionally, some inci-
dent types (e.g., fires) are quite difficult to summarize in such
a matrix as the incident is dynamic; the duration of “the event”
is longer. This complicates determination of what constitutes
an event as opposed to a post-event factor. Lastly, the actions
of different actors (e.g. tunnel users, rescue personnel) are in-
cluded in the matrix to portray the dual-response perspective.
This is presented in the first section of the results.
To respond to the second part (2) of the aim i.e. iden-
tify specific knowledge of providing initial care, the Ma-
jor Incident Medical Management and Support (MIMMS)
framework [22] was utilized as it is familiar to many work-
ing in the prehospital environment; delineating the focus
areas of Command, Safety, Communication, Assessment,
Triage, Treatment and Transportation (CSCATTT). This is
presented in the second section of the results.
3. Results
3.1. Haddon’s Matrix
The factors that influence the outcomes and consequences
of various tunnel incidents are divided into phases and
summarized in Table 3.
Figure 1. Study flow from identification through screening of relevance and quality.
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3.1.1. Human factors
In a tunnel fire the heat and smoke quickly create a fatal en-
vironment [23]. A tunnel fire test has shown that the level of
smoke rises very rapidly and that an area can become com-
pletely engulfed in smoke in 5 minutes. Thus, it is crucial
that the tunnel users swiftly evacuate and that emergency
services reach the area quickly [24]. Meanwhile several
studies have shown that people tend to stay in their vehicles
[24–26] as they often do not recognize the seriousness of
a fire and worry about their possessions [24]. This means
that people are more willing to stay in the well-known and
“safe” environment than to leave the car to evacuate [27].
Examples of this kind of delayed evacuation have been
seen in several mass casualty tunnel fires, such as in the
Mont Blanc tunnel [27]. Encouraging people to find and
use emergency exits, if available, is reported as an issue as
many instead evacuate towards the tunnel portals, as these
are a familiar way out [27]. Through fire drills in tunnels or
first-aider training the public can gain local knowledge and
useful skills which makes them more inclined to find their
way out of the tunnel and/or help others [28]. Knowledge of
previous incidents can also be vital [29].
3.1.2. Technical factors
As many tunnel incidents have shown, actions taken in the
pre-event phase are vital if the emergency response is to
be achieved quickly [30]. This includes technical factors
seen in installations in the tunnel and equipment for the
public and the emergency services. To enable evacua-
tion, emergency exits (less than 300 m apart), signage and
auditory systems must be purposefully designed [24–26].
Additional aspects to enable emergency response include
blast resistant lightings, high setting emergency lighting and
signage visible through smoke [24,26], as increased visibil-
ity eases rescue operations. Access to first aid equipment
and portable fire extinguishers may also be helpful [30].
Communication issues during the response are well-
known and common in mass casualty incidents due to
overload of mobile network, and presents an even greater
challenge in the tunnel environment where mobiles and
radios are often non-functional [28,30–36]. An installed
radio communication system can facilitate communication
between different services [23]. Personal mobiles and avail-
able mobile network infrastructure can allow data sharing
and dissemination of information in and across organiza-
tions [37]. Another important issue for the EMS response is
a functional fire detection system, heat sensors and mon-
itoring and surveillance equipment [23,26], to identify the
precise location of the fire [29]. A fire detection system be-
ing out of service and lack of knowledge of fire location can
delay emergency response [25,29]. While some tunnels
have 24-hour monitoring system, fire-fighting facilities, fire
trucks and dedicated response teams, others are depen-
dent on aid by emergency services and supply emergency
recesses [23,30]. Other specialized equipment for EMS
responders who deal with tunnel incidents include extended
duration breathing apparatus, personal protective equip-
ment (PPE), head lamps and extra oxygen for casualties
[30,32,34,38].
In confined spaces such as subway architecture, fire gas
might disperse less rapidly than it does in an open space
[39]. Fire ventilation can enable responders to better fight
the fire [23] and enable a quick emergency response. In a
twin tube tunnel fire, the smoke will probably be vented and
fire extinguishing can begin in a smoke-free environment.
However, the same fire in a single-tube tunnel can cause
major difficulties in terms of extinguishing the fire depending
on whether the smoke can be vented. Without the possi-
bility of fire ventilation, the fire may require an advanced
smoke diving operation before the fire extinguishing can be-
gin [27]. This, in turn, delays the response and worsens the
situation leading to several deaths and injuries [26]. One
conclusion, in terms of response to large tunnel fires, is that
focus should be on providing ventilation. The duration of
exposure to smoke is very important for the outcome [31].
Natural ventilation may also play a role as shown by an
incident where four people who were exposed to smoke for
one hour survived due to beneficial winds, which allowed
for some breathable air [26,40]. The wind can also have
detrimental effects [23].
3.1.3. Physical environmental factors
The pre-event phase, (i.e., planning of tunnel safety), calls
for an integrated approach that takes the whole environ-
ment into account, including the users, vehicles, transported
goods, infrastructure, and responders [41]. Tunnel design
aspects, such as its length, number of tubes, bi or uni-
directional traffic flow, provision of a service tunnel and fresh
air ducts, have implications for emergency response [30].
Moreover, escape galleries or lighted air-locked corridors
allow for users to evacuate the tunnel and may also provide
storage for smaller evacuation vehicles. Train tunnels emer-
gency stations may provide passengers the opportunity to
access an evacuation tunnel or communication branches
may allow passengers to evacuate through a train on the op-
posite side. Refuges, allocated evenly along the tunnel, are
made to protect tunnel users from the direct atmosphere of
the tunnel by ventilation through fresh air ducts and a light
under-pressure which imposes an air flux [23]. It is vital
that emergency call niches are not confused with escape
galleries or refuges [29]. What might happen when risks
are underestimated and emergencies not considered during
construction, are e.g. that tunnels may not have emergency
routes nor lighting, no means of communication or to open
the doors for the passengers [33].
Also, the fact that many tunnels and subway environ-
ments are outdated, i.e., designed and built a long time
ago, and for other types of vehicles and less traffic, im-
pact the emergency response. For example, the deep tube
lines in London are designed with only a 15 cm clearance
around the carriages and the tunnel sides, which severely
impacted access and evacuation in the London bombing
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[42]. Moreover, confined spaces such as subway trains,
buses and tunnels exacerbate effects of bomb detonations
since surface reflections amplify and prolong the blast wave.
In turn, the blast wind is channeled, and heat and gases are
contained [35,42]. Thus, the severity of injuries among sur-
vivors and mortality is greater in confined space bombings
compared to explosions in open-air environments [32,43].
3.1.4. Socioeconomic environmental factors
Organizational aspects, such as tunnel operator and emer-
gency responders, and contextual resources, like hospitals,
helipads and water resources, are crucial for EMS response
in tunnels [41]. All elements need to be considered together
in a so-called safety chain related to pre-event, event and
post-event phases; including actions to prevent hazards, re-
duce the probability and lessen consequences of incidents
by increasing preparedness among emergency responders
[25]. Contingency plans need to be jointly developed in
order to secure a coherent and coordinated approach to
information sharing and incident management, as well as
opportunities for continued improvements [30,44].
The importance of responders that are specifically
trained and experienced in challenging tunnels and sub-
ways environments, might require extrication skills [32,38,
41,44,45]. As the responders from the police, EMS and
RS are dependent on each other’s actions during incident
management, they also need to be co-trained [34]. The
distribution of roles and responsibilities in relation to other
tunnel staff should be clearly defined [41]. The training
of train/subway staff to deal with emergency situations is
also important, as these can play vital roles in reducing
time for evacuation. The station staff at fire at King’s Cross
underground station lacked training in dealing with such an
incident, which led to actions that actually contributed to the
catastrophe [26]. Other incidents have shown that leaving
responders to solve problems in tunnel incidents only by
using tactics they are familiar with could be detrimental to
the outcome [46]. Meanwhile the presence of experienced
EMS responders on scene of incidents have allowed for
life-saving and advanced interventions [42,45]. Being able
to carry out such procedures is also dependent on actions
in the pre-event phase, such as legislation e.g. when EMS
responders’ use of endotracheal tube or laryngeal mask
to maintain airways was not allowed without permission
[34]. The lack of legislation regarding tunnel safety has also
meant little perceived need or motivation to make invest-
ments to aid emergency response [33].
3.2. Specific EMS Issues to MCIs in Tunnels
The following sections presents an analysis of specific EMS
knowledge structured by CSCATT in tunnel incidents.
3.2.1. Command and Safety
Scene safety is pointed out as a huge concern in tunnel
incident scenarios [25,32,42]. Scene safety assessment
includes different types of issues: 1) Environmental (e.g.
confined space, heat, hazardous materials, collapse); 2)
Biological (e.g. sharps and debris, positive infective risks);
3) Chemical (e.g. smoke, combustion products, particu-
late matter), and 4) Electrical (in the event of incident in
train/subway tunnel). Furthermore, there may be inten-
tional dangers, if the incident had an antagonistic cause
[25,26,32,42]. In addition to these direct threats for EMS
responders and victims there may be indirect threats in
tunnel environments that result in danger depending on
subsequent events [25]. Challenging working conditions
described by the EMS include lighting problems, high tem-
peratures, poor ventilation, obstructed access and contami-
nation by smoke, debris and dust [25,32,35].
3.2.2. Communication
Challenges regarding communication are par for the course
during incident response, and these issues are often aug-
mented by an incident scene in a tunnel. There are several
reasons for this. Firstly, technical difficulties commonly
hamper communication in tunnel environments, which may
isolate EMS responders from dispatch centers [32,38]. Sec-
ondly, two command posts and evacuation sites are often
set up, since tunnel users escape in two directions, implying
additional needs for coordination [31,32,38]. Thirdly, the
two command posts may report to different dispatch centers
if the involved organizations belong to different districts or
even different countries [29,31,38]. Lastly, some tunnels
have different operators responsible for different sections of
the tunnel, who also need to be included in the response
[30]. Meanwhile the ability to manage the incidents sig-
nificantly decreases if communication infrastructure fails
by hampering communications between EMS responders,
dispatch centers and hospitals. This in turn affect patient
distribution with the risk of overwhelming receiving hospi-
tals [34,35,39]. Suggestions for overcoming communication
difficulties on scene include using runners or cars [28,31],
reserving priority lines in the mobile phone network, and
using loudspeakers and megaphones to inform crowds [46].
3.2.3. Assessment
In terms of assessment, the tunnel environment typically
means difficulties for the EMS to get an overview of the
scene, which is necessary to determine what is happening
and suitable tactics. This hampers the gathering of informa-
tion by the EMS and means important decisions on what
actions to take in the initial stages of response must be
made on available and limited information, which may delay
response [26,27]. One method used to gain information for
assessment is through monitoring equipment installed in
the tunnel combined with predetermined, well-thought-out
communication and user interface. One study conclude that
reduced visibility is the first critical mechanism that limits
EMS assessment possibilities. Heat is the second mech-
anism that impedes emergency response or fire-fighting
possibilities. Carbon monoxide does not pose a real threat
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to EMS responders with breathing apparatus, whereas the
effect of falling rubble is a psychological barrier [25].
Suitability of the chosen assessment tactic depends on
the type of fire, surrounding premises and number of peo-
ple involved, which makes information gathering for EMS
assessment one of the most important sub-goals initially.
Another vital focus of assessment may be on the preven-
tion of uncontrolled escalation of an incident, especially in
tunnels that are imbedded in soft soil or beneath water level
as the consequences could be catastrophic if the integrity
of such tunnels failed [25].
The need for EMS responders and their effectiveness
in versus outside the tunnel environment has to be con-
sidered and evaluated in each case. In several cases RS
have transferred casualties from the most hazardous area
on-scene to a place where EMS responders have taken
over [31,36]. If an approach of advanced care by the EMS
in a safe environment is chosen, it will amount to a very
resource intensive effort if the number of injured people
is large [27]. Quickly moving the first found people is not
always the most effective life-saving effort [27]. However,
in the aftermath of an explosion rapid removal of seriously
injured with minimal medical intervention may be an ap-
propriate response [32]. In the response to the Gudvanga
tunnel fire, EMS were released into the tunnel to pick up
road users after the fire was determined to be under control,
but the EMS responders turned around as they considered
the area unsafe without protective equipment [31]. There
have also been instances where medically trained person-
nel among the public and EMS responders have died while
trying to help casualties [36].
3.2.4. Triage, Treatment and Transport
The last three elements during incident response are more
focused on the casualties and concern Triage, Treatment
and Transport. Rapid arrival to the scene may be espe-
cially problematic for tunnel incidents as the transportation
infrastructure itself is affected, which often results in road
congestion [35,38]. Depending on whether it is an urban or
rural scene some access issues may be overcome through
use of bicycles, helicopters and reversal of traffic direction
on certain stretches of road [35,38,45]. Delayed dispatch,
arrival or timing problems on scene have also resulted due
to long distance to reach the injured, safety concerns, con-
fusion regarding number of incidents or injured [32,38,47].
Delayed response in combination with an incident devel-
opment that often is rapid, constitute some factors why
response to tunnel incidents is normally thought of as a two-
phase process; an initial phase, which includes detection,
alarm and self-rescue, followed by the emergency response
intervention phase [44].
The most common types of tunnel incidents mentioned
in the articles were fires, bombings, and tunnel collapses.
Therefore, the treatment section focuses on inhalation in-
juries, blast injuries and crush injuries. In fire incidents,
there have been instances were casualties have had burns
on their skin even though their clothes have appeared un-
harmed. This was seen in the King’s Cross fire where
people needed to be hosed down prior to treatment, as
their clothes were too hot to touch [36]. Considering smoke
inhalation injury it is of utmost importance to realize that
exposure to smoke in a tunnel will continue even though
the fire is put out, dependent on natural wind and use of
ventilation [31]. Tunnel fires often result in long-term smoke
exposure and relatively high smoke intensity and might be
associated with additional complications as they can eas-
ily induce systemic poisoning [31,48]. Some of the most
common mechanisms are absorption of toxic gases in the
blood, inhalation of soot particles, and inhalation of bron-
chopulmonary toxins/irritants [31]. The presence of soot
and facial burns suggest a thermal lesion, which indicates
direct cell injury and is associated with swelling and may
complicate the first 24 hours of treatment. As stated, in
confined spaces the reflection of blast waves from walls
and other surfaces creates complex waves of longer du-
ration, which allow greater transfer of energy to the body,
thereby increasing the risk of primary blast injuries. More-
over, inhalation of carbon monoxide and cyanide may cause
systemic poisoning; a frequent and lethal problem resulting
from fires in confined spaces. The main treatment consists
of administering complementary oxygen until the injured
person becomes asymptomatic. Death caused by hydrogen
cyanide is not uncommon in casualties due to the burning
of plastics [36]. Supplemental oxygen (100%) is recom-
mended in mild cases while patients with severe symptoms
may benefit from methylene blue or transfusion of red blood
cells [48].
In case of collapse, some casualties become entombed
which makes post-collapse rescue difficult, requiring sophis-
ticated rescue resources and pose significant risk to the
responders themselves [49]. Besides calling out, listening
for knocks and shouts and asking others in the rubble if they
see or hear anyone, IR-cameras can be used to scan the
area for body heat emissions and some defibrillators also
have the ability to check for the presence of CO2, which is a
strong indication that someone is breathing in the confined
space. EMS responders with advanced life support training
often carry medications to pre-treat a crush injury casualty
[50].
Common problems initially in terms of transport include
limited availability of ambulances and possibly long trans-
portation times, depending on scene location [38]. These
challenges are mitigated during rush hour and night-time
thanks to a higher likelihood of available helicopters for
transportation and transfer of resources and personnel
[31,32,45]. Other cars and buses have also been used
to augment transportation capabilities [31,38]. While far
from standard Danish RS, have special rescue vehicles
which can drive on both road and rail and can thus per-
form rescue in both types of tunnels [44]. Descriptions of
included references is shown is Table 4.
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Table 3. Factors influencing consequences of various tunnel incidents* compounded into Haddon matrix.
Factor Human factors (#)** Technical factors (#)** Environmental factors (#)**
Phase A B C Physical D Socioeconomic
1 Pre-event
Alcohol/ substance use [40] Traffic speed, volume and other
traffic management aspects
[30,38,41]
Tunnel design, construction
material & maintenance
[30,40,41,46]
Preparedness/disaster plans &
testing [24,30,39,46]
Fatigue [30] Uni- or bidirectional traffic [30] Integrated tunnel safety approach
& safety-chain [25,27,41]
Distraction [30] Provision of emergency
education & training [34,44]
Understanding of safety
advice/announcements [30]
Policies & legislations on tunnel
safety [33,40]
2 Event
Age-related health status [31,33] Speed, size, & load of vehicle
[33,40]
Distance to emergency exits
[26,41,44,46]
Training, co-training and
experience of emergency
responders
[23–26,30–32,34,41,44–46]
Pre-existing conditions
[23–27,29,31,42,43]
Fire extinguishers [28,29,38] Evacuation tunnels or branches
to evacuation trains [29,30,33]
Use of ventilation & jet fans
[23,26,31]
Escape galleries or refuges
[23,25,30]
Sprinkler, hydrant & drainage
system [24–27,40,44]
Containment of blast wave, heat,
gas & smoke
[26,31,35,39,40,42,43]
3 Post-event
Ability, knowledge of &
willingness to self-evacuate
[23,25–29,32,33,40]
Water supply & electrical power
function [38]
Site access, lay-bys &
turning-bays [30–32,42]
Response by tunnel operator,
on-site rapid response team, &
external rescue organizations
[25–27,29,30,33,36,39,41,42,44–
46,48–50]
First-aid training and skills among
injured and bystanders [28,49]
Emergency lighting, signage &
auditory system [38]
Personal protective equipment &
specialist equipment
[27,30,34,38,39,44]
Fire-fighting facilities or
emergency recesses [30,46]
Legal restraints on EMS [34]
Fire detection system and
monitoring [30]
Tunnel length and height
[25,30,44]
Ambulance & helicopter
availability [23,32,35,38,45,47]
First aid equipment [30,50] Single or double-tube tunnel
[27,30]
Alternative vehicles [23,35,38]
Available & functional internal
and external communication
networks [23,28,30,32–37,46]
Urban/rural location [33,38] Contextual resources: hospitals,
helipads, water [41]
* The matrix is usually used to analyze a particular incident, but here data e.g. from tunnel fires, bombings and crashes have been compounded into the
same table. ** Numbers (#) refers to reference number (#) in “Table 4. Description of included references”.
Table 4. Description of included references.
Ref.
#
Authors, year and title Study design, type
of tunnel (scor-
ing/quality)
Main findings/major factors according to Haddons matrix
[23] Vuilleumier et al., 2002.
Safety aspects of rail-
way and road tunnel: ex-
ample of the Lo¨tschberg
railway tunnel and Mont-
Blanc road tunnel
Special report, Road
and rail tunnels
(Low)
A3 & D3: Limited time for self-evacuation and EO response. A2-A3 & D3: Scene approach or evacua-
tion should not take place. B2: Fire ventilation can enable self-rescue and rescue. Equipment and staff
in fire-fighting facilities important. Closed-circuit cameras and heat sensors to aid detection. B3: Radio
systems can facilitate communication. C2: Escape galleries may allow for self-rescue and smaller evacu-
ation vehicles to hel injured and disabled. Allocation and function of refuges, emergency and fire-fighting
recesses important. Lay-bys and turning bays may facilitate rescue. For train tunnels emergency stations
may provide passengers the opportunity to access an evacuation tunnel or communication branches may
allow passengers to evacuate through a train on the opposite side.
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Table 4. Continued.
Ref.
#
Authors, year and title Study design, type
of tunnel (scor-
ing/quality)
Main findings/major factors according to Haddons matrix
[24] Ernst et al., 2006.
Underground trans-
portation systems in
Europe: safety opera-
tions and emergency
response
Non-systematic
review/ Guidelines,
Road and rail tun-
nels (Low)
A2: Human behavior in tunnel fires. B2: Evacuation signage, evacuation system, alarm system, light-
ing options, communication system for selfrescue purposes. D1: Disaster plans. D2: Education and
exercises for emergency personnel. D3: Communication difficulties.
[25] Rosmuller & Van den
Brand, 2003. Emer-
gency response possi-
bilities at freight railway
tunnel accidents
Special report, Road
& Rail tunnels (Low)
A2-A3: Self-rescue passivity. B2 & C2: Inability to find escape doors. C1-C3 & D1-D3: Rescue focus-
ing on preventing escalation vital in tunnels in soft soil or beneath water level due to catastrophic con-
sequences if tunnel fails. D1-D3: Robust tunnel safety relies on a safety chain considering pro-action,
self-rescue, preparation and repression. Response depend on the physical mechanisms and capacities
of emergency responders. Uncertain if emergency organizations will enter threatened tunnel. Response
in freight railway tunnels are extremely limited. Upon arrival the physical conditions have already dete-
riorated so much that hardly anything can be gained from intervention. Rescue service for offensive
emergency response tactics only for operations involving small fires or minor leaks of hazardous mate-
rials. The physical capacities are restricted by heat absorption and harsh working conditions. Reduced
visibility are the critical mechanism that limits response possibilities oxid heat. Carbon monoxide does
not pose a real threat to RS units, but falling rubble is a psychological barrier.
[26] Bergqvist et al., 2005.
Fire and rescue opera-
tions in tunnel fires: a
discussion of some prac-
tical issues
Special report, Road
& Rail tunnels (Low)
A2-3 & C2: Self-rescue reluctance. Self-evacuation highly dependent on distance to a safe environment
B2: Tunnels should have a permanently installed hydrant system. Emergency exits and signage must
be purposefully designed. Examples of positive and negative effect of natural ventilation. Dire conse-
quences can amount from wrong decision regarding ventilation. Clean air needed to reduce the toxicity
thus focus should be on providing ventilation to facilitate self-rescue. This requires a lot of information.
Monitoring and surveillance equipment can provide needed information. C2: In a tunnel fire the gases
will not dissipate in the same way as in a house fire. How far fire gases extend depend e.g. on the roof
height of the tunnel. D2: Train crew need emergency training to reduce evacuation time or their actions
might contribute to the catastrophe. Management by staff play an important role during emergencies.
D3: Determination of incident cause and scene overview difficult which causes coordination problems.
Ventilation may obscure origin of fire. Lack of information a problem for rescue. Decisions on actions
to take based on available, limited information. Practical fire trials have shown risk of collapse of tun-
nels. Trains and electrical current pose hazards. Communication is vital for coordination and safety of
personnel.
[27] Ingason et al., 2005.
Rescue in road tunnels
Modelling study,
Road tunnel (High)
A2-A3: Delayed self-evacuation. B2: Need for clear signs to encourage self-evacuation. Drivers who
see other people evacuate are more likely to also do so. Many evacuate towards the tunnel portals. B3:
Monitoring equipment combined with a predetermined communication and user interface aids gathering
of information. Reconnaissance by vehicle or on foot with IR-cameras and lighting cables may be helpful.
C3-D3: Single-tube tunnel fire cause difficulties in fire extinguishing and rescue. D1: Those responsible
for safety underestimate challenges. D3: Rescue service may not have appropriate work methods,
materials or personnel. Different methods by the rescue services usually combined to form a viable
rescue effort. Suitability of the chosen method depends on the type of fire, surrounding premises and
number of people involved. Gathering information often hampered by an inability to over-view the scene.
[28] Bruyelle et al., 2014. Im-
proving the resilience of
metro vehicle and pas-
sengers for an effective
emergency response to
terrorist attacks
Case study, Subway
(Medium)
A3: Important to view casualties as actors, capable of helping themselves and one another. Fire drills or
first-aider training are vital since people with local knowledge and useful skills are more inclined to help
others. B2-B3: Inability to open side doors in carriage hinders evacuation. Blast resistant emergency
lighting and signage, visible through smoke may help improve evacuation. Blasts and underground
location impacts communication equipment. Absence of first aid equipment impedes help from medically
trained bystanders.
[29] Voeltzel & Dix, 2004. A
comparative analysis of
the Mont Blanc, Tauern
and Gotthard tunnel
fires
Comparative case
study, Road tunnel
(Medium)
A2: Self-rescue essential. A3: Awareness by users has impact on self-evacuation decision. B2: Fire
detection system out of service. Detecting the precise location of the fire is imperative. Tunnel users
could not extinguish fires with fire extinguishers provided. C2: Fatalities from heat in shelter. Vital
that emergency call niches and are not confused with evacuation routes or pressurized shelters. D3:
On-coordinated control centers at each end of tunnel.
[30] Burns, 2005. Emer-
gency preparedness in
road tunnels: current
practice and future
ideas
Special report, Road
tunnel (Low)
A1: In tunnels on major international routes tunnel users may be tired from travelling, may not be alert
and may be a foreign national who cannot understand safety advice or announcements. B1: Traffic
management aspect with implications for emergency response include traffic volume, traffic speed, the
nature of the vehicles using the tunnel. B3: First aid and fire fight equipment for the public have impli-
cations for possibilities to prevent escalation of events. The EOs need specialist equipment to deal with
tunnel incidents, e.g. extended duration breathing apparatus and communication equipment functional
in tunnels and across organizational boundaries. C1: There is a need to understand the implications of
tunnel design on emergency response. B3 & C1-C3: Tunnel design and technical equipment that has
implications for emergency response e.g. length, cross sections, bi- or uni-directional flow, emergency
refuges, fresh air ducts, jet fans, warning-system for drivers, sprinklers, carbon monoxide monitoring
equipment. C3: Emergency response can be carried out by dedicated rapid response teams or by
national emergency services. Some tunnels have 24 hour monitoring and surveillance with dedicated
response teams. Some tunnels, that cross national boarders, have different operators responsible for
different sections of the tunnel. D1: Pre-planning & preparation is vital if assisted rescue and firefighting
is to be affected quickly. Contingency plans need to be jointly developed in order to secure a coherent
and coordinated approach to incident management. D2: Maintaining preparedness for tunnel incidents
is often difficult in large organizations. D3: Commercial vehicle & bus fires are seldom possible to put
out, instead burning out on their own
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Ref.
#
Authors, year and title Study design, type
of tunnel (scor-
ing/quality)
Main findings/major factors according to Haddons matrix
[31] Statens Haverikom-
misjon for Transport,
2015 Report of truck fire
on the E16 in the Gud-
vangatunnel in Aurland
the 5th of August 2013
Special report, Road
tunnel (Low)
A2-B2: Smoke exposure in a tunnel even when the fire is put out, dependent on natural wind and use
of ventilation. A2-C2: Duration of smoke exposure is important for outcome. C3: Two command posts
and evacuation sites, due to dual-direction of evacuees, imply added needs for coordination. Smoke
divers may relay users to ambulances. Uncertain need for medical personnel in the tunnel. Ventilated
smoke direction may hinder EMS staff ingress. Differing safety concerns between involved response
organizations. Private cars and buses may augment transportation capabilities.
[32] Lockey et al., 2005.
London bombings July
2005: the immediate
prehospital medical re-
sponse
Case study, Subway
(Medium)
B3: Mobile network and telecommunication failed in underground. Full protective equipment vital. C3-
D3: Dual-direction evacuation led to assumption of two incidents. D2: Value of personnel experienced
in pre-hospital environment. Control rooms isolated from operational teams. Poor working conditions.
Helicopter availability essential for staff and equipment deployment. Scene safety a major concern.
[33] Larsson, 2004. The tun-
nel accident in Kaprun
Case study/report,
Furnicular (Medium)
A2-3 & D3: Passengers who did not self-evacuate estimated to have perished prior to rescue service
arrival. B2: No evacuation lighting. No possibility to call for help or contact driver. Unable to open doors
to evacuate; some improvised opening by breaking side window. Electricity and communication network
failed. B3: Radio use not possible due to location. Mobile network overloaded. C2: Staircase used
to evacuate not purpose-built. C3-D3: Topography complicated rescue. D1-D3: Lack of safety policies
and legislation demanding emergency routes were not considered necessary. Successful drills and
evacuations were regularly carried out but such an explosive fire scenario had never been considered.
Staff in the crisis management thought the incident was impossible and initially assumed that it was a
drill. Staff at top station underestimated danger and were soon overwhelmed by smoke. The first one
found by RS was the only one that survives. Experiences from the Tauern tunnel fire meant the crisis
management organizations tried to limit the involved actors.
[34] Okumura et al., 1998.
The Tokyo Subway
Sarin Attack: Disaster
Management, Part 1:
Community Emergency
Response
Case study, Subway
(Medium)
B3: PPE need to be available for prehospital personnel. D1-D3: No field decontamination was planned
or took place during response. Around 10% of EMTs were secondarily exposed to sarin and needed
treatment. EMTs were not allowed to maintain airway with endotracheal tube or laryngeal mask airway.
Due to communication overload EMTs could not contact doctors. Could not get hospital availability
information. Cases of delayed symptoms during transportation. Hospital personnel dispatched to scenes
were not needed for advanced medical procedures.
[35] Ryan & Montgomery,
2005. Terrorism and the
Medical Response
Case study, Subway
(Medium)
B3: Communication infrastructure failed due to overload hampering coordination. C2: Confined spaces
exacerbate effects of bomb detonations, increasing injury severity and resultant mortality. D3: Multi-
attack means pressure on EMS and demand on communication. Underground locations add problems
of site access and safety, as well as the need for specialist training and extrication skills. Targeting and
closing of transportation system lead to road congestion, preventing medical staff from reaching scene
or hospital as well as patient discharge.
[36] Halle´n & Kulling, 1990.
Fire at the King’s Cross
subway station on 18th
of November 1987
Case study/report,
Subway (Medium)
B3: Radio equipment did not work underground. D3: Rescue services relayed casualties. A freelance
doctor and a rescue worker died while trying to help People needed to be hosed down because their
clothes were so hot and several had burns on their skin even though their clothes appeared unharmed.
Many of those that succumbed did so from poisoning by hydrogen cyanide and oxygen deprivation.
[37] Sandersson et al., 2007.
Developing mobile mid-
dle ware - an analysis of
rescue and emergency
operations
Special report, Rail
tunnel; Subway
(Low)
B3: Sparse MANETs to overcome communication difficulties during response.
[38] Heltne, 2015. Truck and
tunnel fire
Perspective article,
Road tunnel (Low)
B1-B3: Inadequate portable fire extinguishers. Unfuncional fans and lighting due to fire in the electri-
cal system. B2 & D3: Poor contact to mobile net due to location. Communications failure between
personnel on different sides of tunnel. Partially successful use of cell phones and social media scan-
ning. C3-D3: Initial traffic jam solved by change of traffic direction. D3: Delay in patient access due
to transport patients due to rural area. Effective triage by HEMS, appropiate use of transportation and
several hospitals involved in patient distribution. Different organizational districts, dual command posts,
evacuation sites, and dispatch centers impeded communication and coordination.
[39] Tokuda et al., 2006. Pre-
hospital management of
sarin nerve gas terror-
ism in urban settings: 10
years of progress after
the Tokyo subway sarin
attack
Case study, Subway
(Medium)
B3: No protective equipment for EMTs; 10% of EMTs poisoned. C2: Indoor setting lessened gas
dispersal. D1: No plan for on-site decontamination. D3: Little cooperation and communication among
emergency organizations. Distribution of casualties suboptimal due to communication failure.
[40] Carvel & Marlair, 2005.
A history of fire incidents
in tunnels
Special report, Road
- Rail tunnels (Low)
A1-3: Human behavior in response to fires often detrimental to survival. B2: HGV presence contributed
to fire load. Sucessful self-rescue thanks to sprinkler system. C2: Deaths due to heat in emergency
shelters. C1 & D1: Tunnel safety has to start at design stage.
[41] Manca & Brambilla,
2011. A methodology
based on the Analytic
Hierarchy Process
for the quantitative
assessment of emer-
gency preparedness
and response in road
tunnels.
Modelling study,
Road tunnel (High)
B1 & C1: Tunnel safety aspects include physical features e.g. slope, length, emergency exits, emer-
gency lighting and its internal equipment e.g., sidewalks and sirens. C1 & D1: Emergency response
also dependent on contextual resources available in the neighboring areas of the tunnel e.g., hospitals,
helipads, water basins. D1-D3: Written plans are important, but proper distribution of information dur-
ing emergencies is required. Tunnel safety aspects include organizational aspects of the emergency
preparedness and response e.g. definition of responsibility areas, roles, procedures. The training of
responders affects the emergency response.
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[42] Baker & Murray, 2013.
Emergency medical and
public health responses
to the 2005 London
bombings
Case study (book
ch), Subway
(Medium)
A2 & C2: Bomb affect amplification by the reflection of blast wave. C3-D3: Access issues at carriage in
tunnel. D3: Scene risks assessments aspects.
[43] Chalonel, 2005. Blast in-
jury in enclosed spaces.
Special report, Other
(Low)
A2 & C2: Enclosed environments increase reflection of blast waves; greater mortality and severity of
injuries.
[44] Olesen, 2005. Emer-
gency procedures in rail
tunnels: current practice
and future ideas
Special report, Rail
tunnel (Low)
B2-B3: Danish rescue service have special rescue vehicles which can drive on both road and rail. C2-C3
& D2-D3: Rail compared to road tunnels, longer approach route, need for specialist vehicles for transport,
greater collective fire load. A major advantage is the presence of train personnel who can help improve
the situation. D1-D3: Incident procedures may be dependent on legislation and standard procedure
functions in and between authorities. Rules of engagement and approach to tunnel incidents by the
emergency medical services differs between countries due to legislation, equipment, prior experience
and the specific scenario and the condition of survivors. Due to lower risk of an incident in a rail tunnel
compared to roads the motivation and perceived necessity for safety and emergency procedures is less.
A simplified contingency plan up describing concrete actions of actors involved and coordination aspects
specified. Plans, procedures and action lists should be tested through small-scale exercise before major
validation exercise.
[45] Lyon & Sanders, 2012.
The Swiss bus acci-
dent on 13 March 2012:
lessons for pre-hospital
care
Case study, Bus
(Medium)
D2: Experienced pre-hospital doctors on-scene allowed advanced interventions. Experience in pedi-
atric trauma rare among EMS staff. D3: Pre-hospital pediatric triage more complex than adult triage.
Helicopter availability essential for staff and equipment deployment.
[46] Helbing & Mukerji, 2012.
Crowd disasters as sys-
temic failures: Analysis
of the Love Parade Dis-
aster
Case study/report,
Road tunnel
(Medium)
D1-D3: Love Parade incident caused by “crowd turbulence”. B1: Signs and loudspeaker announcements
were not available to inform public. B3 & D3: Prompt action was delayed by communication problems.
C1-C3: Lack of recognizable and accessible emergency exits. D1: Event and disaster plan lacking to
avoid incident and minimize consequences.
[47] Aylwin et al., 2006. Re-
duction in critical mortal-
ity in urban mass casu-
alty incidents: analysis
of triage, surge, and re-
source use after the Lon-
don bombings on July 7,
2005
Case study, Subway
(Medium)
D3: Number of incidents confused due to dual-direction evacuation. Over-triage rates lower at scenes
triaged by London HEMS. Triage errors and surge reduced by trained, experienced decision-makers.
Rate of casualty clearance hampered on underground scene due to scene access and patient extrication
issue, plus ambulance provision.
[48] Bassi et al., 2014. As-
sistance of inhalation in-
jury victims caused by
fire in confined spaces:
what we learned from
the tragedy at Santa
Maria.
Special report, Other
(Low)
D3: Inhalation injuries in confined spaces.
[49] Petinaux et al., 2014.
Confined space
medicine and the
medical management
of complex rescues: a
case series
Retrospective case
series/ Comparative
case study, Other
(Medium)
A3 & D3: Bystanders and first responders accomplish many post-collapse rescues but some victims
may be deeply entombed, making detection difficult and requiring sophisticated rescue resources. D3:
Few published reports document the specific medical challenges encountered in rescues of entrapped
patients, more commonly focusing on the patients’ condition after entrapment. Rescue from a collapsed
structure can pose significant risk to the responders.
[50] Berlin et al., 2010.
Providers improvise
with confined space
patient
Non-systematic
review/guideline,
Other (Low)
B3 & D3: Prehospital care of crush injuries. Early, aggressive treatment of hyperkalemia necessary for
survival.
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4. Discussion
This literature review shows that few studies, especially of
high quality, actually provide detailed information regarding
emergency response to tunnel incidents and those that do,
often have a main focus on management by the RS. While
many incidents studied were caused by fires in tunnels,
thus requiring RS action, the subsequent EMS response
issues that have taken place appear to have been given
limited attention. Important exceptions to this inadequacy
were several reports from the London bombings and the
Tokyo sarin attack, both of which were of antagonistic origin.
The lack of studies inhibits efforts to optimize the survival
rates and health of the injured in MCIs in tunnels, as well
as efforts to provide a safe and effective work environment
for EMS responders.
This review found a heavy focus on pre-event factors.
Studies repeatedly highlighted that heat and smoke quickly
create a fatal environment, which in turn means that scene
safety is a huge concern in tunnel environments. Tunnel
design may also have further implications for the EMS re-
sponse. Regarding the EMS response, research highlights
communication issues due to overload or non-functional
radios in tunnel environments, difficulties with getting an
overview of the scene, and the lack of real-life experience
or training in this specific environment, which could impede
the evacuation and EMS response. Overall, there is a need
for more research including the EMS perspective regard-
ing tunnel incidents and training, but much can likely be
clarified by merging already existent research and future
projects using inter-disciplinary approaches, but also for a
more extensive collaboration between different actors in the
construction phase of tunnels. Compared to research on
e.g. the injury mechanisms of terrorist attacks [51], stud-
ies of the medical response to tunnel incidents are clearly
lacking.
This review also found that safety is a huge concern.
There are several safety-limitations for the EMS to apply
offensive operational tactics in a threatened tunnel tube. Of-
fensive action might result in endangering the lives of EMS
responders, while the effects in terms of rescue are highly
uncertain. In case of a fire, the conditions like visibility and
temperature have usually deteriorated in such a way that
an effective rescue operation is risky [25].
In the included studies, it has been shown that if an
incident occurs in a tunnel, the immediate mortality rate and
severity of injuries increase and the consequences may fur-
ther be worsened as emergency services can be impeded
from swift access and are constrained from using their nor-
mal work practices. Recent medical development and EMS
training, such as the use of tourniquets and rapid transport
to advanced trauma centers, has meant that injuries sus-
tained in bombings, such as traumatic amputations, that
were once considered a marker for a lethal outcome, are
now survivable [51,52].
4.1. Conclusion
There is a need to increase the specific knowledge of EMS
response during major incidents in tunnels. To optimize
the survival rates and health of the injured, as well as to
provide a safe and effective work environment for the emer-
gency services, there is a need to explore the event phase.
Knowledge gained from the incident’s post-event phase and
through exercises need to be explored, to better prepare
responders for joint effective tactics. When it comes to pre-
vention of MCI, there is also a lot to learn from table-top
and full-scale exercises and actions taken when low-scale
incidents were prevented from becoming large-scaled.
Further investigation of specific challenges regarding
information exchange, collaboration and initiatives for knowl-
edge transfer between responders to provide prehospital
care, and how to establish joint efforts in the emergency re-
sponse (specifically during the initial event phase) is needed.
Similarly, with regard to EMS care in major tunnel incidents
where more offensive interventions are far away, prepara-
tion and practice is lacking.
4.2. Limitations
This study had the ambition to review information about
emergency response and EMS care associated with inci-
dents in tunnels. However, the existing literature presented
few such examples, resulting in the inclusion of related
issues and grey literature to a larger degree than initially
planned.
Aspects that were problematic to fully map out were
those that precede the care during rescue operations in
tunnels. The difficulty in finding these issues partly lies in
the systematic literature search methodology. It was a bal-
ance act to identify preventive actions that directly impacted
the need and possibilities for an effective EMS response
without also including indirect matters. It was especially
challenging to find relevant information if “embedded” or
surrounded by clearly irrelevant information, which resulted
in the inclusion of articles that contained only a sentence
or two of interest. Thus, the precondition aspects may not
have been fully mapped out as, for example, studies focus-
ing on technical matters and human behaviors in tunnel
incidents were excluded while these might have (at least
secondary) essential impact on EMS response and care.
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